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Earlier literature on tax competition and policy coordination typ-
ically assumes that the labor market is competitive; a description
less suitable for Europe, where trade unions have had a strong posi-
tion in the labor market for a long time. This paper concerns factor
income taxation and public good provision in small open economies
characterized by capital mobility and imperfect competition in the
labor market. We assume that each national government collects
public revenues via taxes on labor, capital and pro￿t income, and
that the revenues are spent on a public consumption good and a
public input good, where the latter enters the economic system in
terms of an ￿ externality production factor￿ . The overall purposes
are to characterize the tax and expenditure policies, if decided upon
at the national level, and analyze the welfare e⁄ects of policy coor-
dination with respect to taxes and public expenditures. Among the
results, we show that tax coordination contributes to higher wel-
fare if it reduces the net interest rate and the wage rate, and that
the relative overprovision of the public input good derived by Keen
and Marchand (1997) in the context of a competitive economy may
no longer hold, if the labor market is non-competitive.
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As productive capital is mobile across countries, it has been recognized that indepen-
dent national governments have incentives to adjust their public policies in order to
compete for mobile capital. Earlier literature dealing with ￿scal competition and/or
policy coordination (in order to internalize the associated externalities) has focused
much attention on tax policy1. A major result is that tax competition leads to
undertaxation of capital (at least if the economies are characterized by competitive
markets) which may, in turn, give rise to underprovision of public goods relative to
the ￿rst best2. However, much less attention has been paid to the related issue of
how the tax revenues are spent, i.e. the mix of public expenditures. An important
exception is Keen and Marchand (1997), who make a distinction between a public
consumption good, which enters the economic system via the utility function, and
a public input good entering as an ￿ externality production factor￿ . In their study,
the set of tax instruments contains linear taxes on labor and capital and a (nondis-
tortionary) pro￿t tax. If, as they assume, the nondistortionary tax instrument does
not raise enough revenues (meaning that distortionary taxes must be used), the re-
sults show that the public input good will be ine¢ ciently large relative to the public
consumption good in an uncoordinated equilibrium, where each national govern-
ment behaves as a Nash competitor. The intuition in terms of their model is that
the public consumption good does not, itself, give rise to externalities, whereas the
public input good strengthens the externality caused by the competition for mobile
capital.
The literature discussed above is based on the assumption of competitive mar-
kets. In this paper, we relax the assumption that the labor market is competitive
and assume, instead, that the wage rate is decided upon by bargaining between
unions and ￿rms, meaning that the equilibrium is characterized by involuntary un-
employment. Given this description of the labor market, our paper deals with factor
income taxation and public good provision in small open economies competing for
mobile capital. To be able to address the mix of public expenditures, we follow
Keen and Marchand in the sense of distinguishing between a public consumption
good and a public input good, while the set of tax instruments contains linear taxes
on labor and capital and a nondistortionary pro￿t tax. The overall purposes are
to characterize the tax and expenditure policies, if decided upon at the national
1See e.g. Wilson (1986), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Mintz and Tulkens (1986). See
also Wilson (1999) for an overview.
2Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) show that also labor taxes tend to be too low in an uncoordi-
nated equilibrium.
2level, and analyze the welfare e⁄ects of policy coordination with respect to taxes
and public expenditures.
There are several reasons for considering imperfect competition in the labor mar-
ket in the context of optimal taxation and public goods. First, unions are important
institutions, at least in a European context, suggesting that the introduction of im-
perfect competition in the labor market provides additional realism to the study of
taxation, public goods and policy coordination. Considering that many countries
have experienced high rates of unemployment for a long time, it is clearly rele-
vant to extend the theory of ￿scal competition accordingly. Second, by analyzing
the mix of public goods more thoroughly in the context of ￿scal competition, our
study provides a complement to the literature developed so far on optimal taxation
and public provision (of public and private goods) in economies with involuntary
unemployment3.
Policy coordination under imperfect competition in the labor market has been
addressed by Lejour and Verbon (1996) and Fuest and Huber (1999). Lejour and
Verbon analyze social insurance ￿nanced by labor income taxation in a two-country
economy. In their study, where a monopoly union characterizes the labor mar-
ket, capital mobility leads to undertaxation in an uncoordinated equilibrium. As a
consequence, a coordinated tax increase leads to higher welfare. Fuest and Huber
consider ￿scal competition and policy coordination in small open economies with
right-to-manage wage formation. They assume that the set of tax instruments fac-
ing each national government consists of linear taxes on labor and capital and a 100
per cent pro￿t tax, while the expenditure side includes a public consumption good.
Their main contribution is then to show that coordinated labor and capital tax in-
creases will not necessarily increase the welfare, if the labor market is characterized
by right-to-manage wage formation4 (coordinated increases in the labor and capital
taxes would increase welfare in their model, if the labor market were competitive).
Our paper di⁄ers from the aforementioned studies in several ways. One such
di⁄erence is that we pay more attention to the expenditure side by considering
the mix of public goods; as such our paper is connected to the study by Keen
and Marchand. In addition, the distinction between two types of public goods
3See e.g. Marceau and Boadway (1994), Fuest and Huber (1997), Koskela and Sch￿b (2002),
Aronsson and Sj￿gren (2004a) and Aronsson et al. (2005).
4There are other possible reasons for policy coordination in open economies characterized by
right-to-manage wage formation. For instance, ￿rms might move abroad in case the bargain fails.
This means that the wage formation system gives rise to an international externality (as the
reservation pro￿t is determined abroad and treated as exogenous in the context of domestic public
policy) which, in turn, motivates policy coordination; see Aronsson and Sj￿gren (2004b).
3also enables us to address the interesting issue of how the additional tax revenues,
following a coordinated increase in each of the tax instruments, are spent. To be
more speci￿c, our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. The ￿rst is by
characterizing the uncoordinated equilibrium, which is based on the assumption
that each small country treats the world interest rate as well as the policies chosen
by other countries as exogenous. The second is by considering policy coordination,
where we examine the welfare e⁄ects of (i) an increase in each of the tax rates, while
allowing the additional tax revenues to be spent either on the public consumption
good or the public input good, and (ii) a revenue neutral reallocation of the public
expenditures. Among the results, we show that tax coordination contributes to
higher welfare if it reduces the net interest rate and the wage rate, and that the
relative overprovision of the public input good derived by Keen and Marchand may
no longer hold, if the labor market is non-competitive.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model and analyze
the outcome of private optimization. Section 3 characterizes the uncoordinated
Nash equilibrium from the perspective of public policy. The welfare e⁄ects of policy
coordination are analyzed in section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 The model
Since our analysis does not address redistribution, we simplify by considering a
representative-agent economy, where the agent (or household) is rationed in the
labor market. The utility function is written
U = U(C;G); (1)
where C is a private consumption good and G a public consumption good. We
assume that U(￿) is increasing in both arguments and strictly quasiconcave. The
budget constraint is given by
C = ￿K + !L + (N ￿ L)b + (1 ￿ ts)￿; (2)
in which ￿ is the net interest rate, K the capital endowment, ! the net wage rate, L
employment, b the monetary value attached to leisure by the consumer5, ￿ the pro￿t
5An alternative interpretation of b would be in terms of an unemployment bene￿t. However,
in order to avoid unnecessary structure (from the point of view of the purpose of the paper),
unemployment bene￿ts are not part of the choice set facing the government. This simpli￿cation is
not important for the qualitative results to be derived below.
4income and ts the pro￿t tax rate. If N is thought of as ￿ the number of household
members￿ , then L is interpretable as the number of household members who are in
employment. The gross wage rate and interest rate are de￿ned as w = !(1 + tw)
and r = ￿(1 + tc), respectively, where tw is the labor tax rate and tc the capital tax
rate.
Turning to the production side of the economy, the representative ￿rm produces
a homogenous good by using labor, capital and the public input good, P. The
public input good works as an ￿ externality production factor￿in the sense that it is
exogenous to the ￿rm. We assume that the public input good raises the productivity
of private factors and does not itself generate pro￿ts, meaning that the number of
￿rms in each country is not important for the analysis and can be normalized to
one6. However, in order to formalize the wage bargaining part of the model (see
below), we also require that the ￿rms produce rents to bargain over. Therefore, the
production function, F(K;L;P), exhibits decreasing returns to scale in the private
production factors, so FKKFLL ￿ (FKL)
2 > 0. The objective function of the ￿rm is
written as
￿ = F(K;L;P) ￿ wL ￿ rK; (3)
where the output price has been normalized to one for notational convenience. The
￿rm chooses labor and capital to maximize pro￿ts, which gives the factor demand
functions,
K = K(w;r;P); (4)
L = L(w;r;P), (5)
and the pro￿t function
￿ = ￿(w;r;P): (6)
The net wage rate is determined by bargaining between unions and ￿rms, and
wage formation is decentralized. The latter is interpreted to mean that each union is
small enough to treat economy-wide aggregates as well as the government￿ s decision
variables as exogenous, which is a reasonable description of the wage formation
system in many countries. By analogy to the treatment of the production sector,
the number of unions will be normalized to one. If we de￿ne C0 = ￿K+Nb+(1￿ts)￿
and U0 = U(C0;G) to be the consumption and utility, respectively, of the household
6See e.g. McMillan (1979) and Matsumoto (1998).
5in case the bargain fails, the rent for the union from the bargain becomes ￿ =
U ￿ U0. The pro￿t income accruing to each household is its share of the aggregate
(economy-wide) pro￿t, and we assume that this measure of pro￿t income is treated
as exogenous in the context of a single ￿rm-union bargain. The rent for the ￿rm
is equal to the net pro￿t it earns in the production since its reference pro￿t (which
applies in case the bargain fails) is equal to zero. The outcome of the bargain will
be the net wage rate which maximizes the generalized Nash product
￿ = ￿
a [(1 ￿ ts)￿]
1￿a ; (7)
where a is the bargaining power of the union. Following earlier literature on optimal
taxation under imperfect competition in the labor market, we assume that the union
is acting Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the household during wage formation. By
substituting equations (2), (4) and (5) into equation (7), we can use the resulting
￿rst order condition to write the net wage rate as a function of the policy variables,
tw, tc, G and P, and of the net interest rate,
! = !(tw;r;￿;P;G): (8)
Note that the pro￿t tax vanishes from the ￿rst order condition and is, therefore,
not an argument in the wage equation. For later use, note also that the net interest
rate, ￿, in￿ uences the net wage rate via two channels; (i) as a separate argument
(which captures a pure income e⁄ect on ￿) and (ii) as an indirect e⁄ect via the
gross interest rate, r = (1 + tc)￿. The parameters a and b have been suppressed for
notational convenience.
3 Noncooperative Nash equilibrium
Let us begin by considering the tax and expenditure policies in a noncooperative
Nash equilibrium, where each national government treats the policy instruments of
the other countries as exogenous. The order of decision-making is such that the gov-
ernment is ￿rst mover and recognizes how the private sector (including the union)
responds to its policies, while the private sector is follower. The objective function of
the national government is the indirect utility function of the representative house-
hold, which is obtained by substituting equations (2), (4), (5) and (6) into equation
(1);
V = U(￿K + !(tw;r;￿;P;G)L(w;r;P) + (N ￿ L(w;r;P))b (9)
+ (1 ￿ ts)￿(w;r;P);G);
6in which we also recognize that the net wage rate is endogenous from the perspective
of the government and given by equation (8). In addition, recall that w = (1+tw)!
and r = (1 + tc)￿, where the government treats ￿ as constant as we are considering
a small open economy. The government￿ s budget constraint can be written as
ts￿(w;r;P) + tw!(tw;r;￿;P;G)L(w;r;P) + tc￿K(w;r;P) ￿ G ￿ P = 0; (10)
where we assume that the marginal rates of transformation between the private and
the public goods are equal to one. Furthermore, following earlier literature on factor
income taxation7, we also recognize the possibility that pro￿t taxation is restricted.
Let 0 ￿ ￿ ts ￿ 1 be the upper limit of the pro￿t tax and write the constraint on the
pro￿t tax as follows;
￿ ts ￿ ts ￿ 0: (11)
The decision problem of the national government is to choose tw, tc, ts, G and
P in order to maximize the indirect utility function given by equation (9) subject
to the budget constraint and the maximum restriction on the pro￿t tax. By using
the short notation
R = ts￿(w;r;P) + tw!(tw;r;￿;P;G)L(w;r;P) + tc￿K(w;r;P); (12)
the Lagrangean can be written as
L = V + ￿[R ￿ P ￿ G] + ￿[￿ ts ￿ ts]: (13)
The tax policy implications following from a simpli￿ed version of the decision-
problem (where the utility function is linear in private consumption) has been ad-
dressed by Koskela and Sch￿b (2002). It is, nevertheless, instructive to begin by
brie￿ y discussing the tax structure chosen by the national government, since the
characteristics of this tax structure will be used in the analysis of policy coordina-
tion in the next section. De￿ne ^ ￿ = ￿=UC to be the marginal cost of public funds
in real terms, where UC = UC(C;G) = @U(C;G)=@C is the marginal utility of con-
sumption, and let ^ ￿ = ￿=UC be the shadow price of the pro￿t tax in real terms. We
also introduce the short notations !tw = @!=@tw, !tc = @!=@tc and wtw = @w=@tw.
Consider Proposition 1;
Proposition 1 In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the tax structure is char-
acterized by
(^ ￿ ￿ 1)￿ ￿ ^ ￿ = 0;
7See e.g. Koskela and Sch￿b (2002).
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LFLK ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ts)(KFKK + LFLK)
￿
;
where FLL, FKK and FLK = FKL are second order partial derivatives of the produc-
tion function.
Proof: see the Appendix.
Note ￿rst that, if the constraint on the pro￿t tax is binding, so ^ ￿ > 0, it follows
that ts = ￿ ts and ^ ￿ > 1. In other words, if the government must use distortionary
taxes, then the marginal cost of public funds exceeds one. Except for the ￿nal term
in the expression for tw, which re￿ ects the incentive for the government to subsidize
labor due to the presence of involuntary unemployment, the expressions for tw and
tc share a similar structure. In each tax formula, the terms within the bracket re￿ ect
the desire to raise revenues by means of distortionary taxes in an e¢ cient way; the
￿rst two terms appear because the two tax rates a⁄ect the net wage rate, and the
third arises because labor and capital taxes constitute indirect means of taxing pro￿t
as long as ￿ ts < 1. On the other hand, if ￿ ts = 1 (and, of course, provided that the
constraint on the pro￿t tax is binding), the third term within the bracket of each
formula vanishes. These e⁄ects are well understood from earlier research - let be in
a slightly di⁄erent framework than ours - and need not be further discussed here.
Given the choice of tax structure, what factors characterize the optimal mix
of public goods from the perspective of each individual country? Let subindices
attached to w(￿), !(￿), ￿(￿), U(￿), L(￿), K(￿) and F(￿) denote partial derivatives and
consider Proposition 2;
Proposition 2 In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the provision of public goods
is characterized by
FP ￿ 1 =
(^ ￿ ￿ 1)
^ ￿










(^ ￿ ￿ 1)
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￿ tw!LwwG ￿ tc￿KwwG:
8The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. Each formula in Propo-
sition 2 is written in terms of the way in which it deviates from the corresponding
optimality rule, which applies when public expenditures have no impact on the do-
mestic real variables. The main di⁄erence between the two formulas is that, whereas
the public input good gives rise to direct e⁄ects on the pro￿t and factor employ-
ment (￿P = FP, LP and KP in the equation for the provision of P), the public
consumption good only a⁄ects the pro￿t and factor employment indirectly via the
wage rate8. Note that, in the absence of these e⁄ects, the public input good would
obey the ￿rst best policy rule, FP = 1, while the public consumption good would
be characterized by a modi￿ed second best rule, UG=UC = ^ ￿ (which is equivalent to
the ￿rst best rule if ^ ￿ = 1).
The ￿rst term on the right hand side of each expression is due to the use of
distortionary taxes. Since ^ ￿ > 1, it follows that the marginal bene￿t of lump-sum
income for the private sector, UC, falls short of the marginal cost for society if
the government were to claim these additional resources via distortionary taxation,
￿. This necessitates, in turn, that the public good is adjusted, if it a⁄ects the
private income and tax revenues to the same extent. It is this adjustment that the
￿rst term on the right hand side accomplishes. The second part of the ￿rst row is
due to the presence of involuntary unemployment. If public provision gives rise to
increased (decreased) employment, ceteris paribus, this constitutes an incentive for
the government to provide more (less) of the public good than it would otherwise
have done. Note also that this e⁄ect becomes less important, relative to the other
components, the higher the marginal cost of public funds. In other words, the
greater the cost for society of raising additional tax revenues, the weaker will be
the incentive to adjust the provision of the public good in order to increase the
employment. The second row of each formula re￿ ects tax base e⁄ects, which are
de￿ned conditional on the tax rates. The intuition is that increased public provision
may either exacerbate or counteract the preexisting tax distortions, depending on
how the public provision a⁄ects the tax base. Since the public revenues are costly to
raise, this constitutes an incentive for the government to modify the public provision.
Therefore, if the provision of public goods increases (decreases) the tax revenues,
then the government spends more (less) on public provision than it would otherwise
have done.
8See the Appendix for a discussion of how P and G a⁄ect the wage rate.
94 Policy Coordination
Since the countries compete for a ￿xed worldwide capital stock, the policy outcome of
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium described in Section 3 is not optimal from the
perspective of society as a whole, de￿ned as the group of countries. The intuition is,
of course, that each national government treats the net interest rate as given, whereas
it is an endogenous variable for society as a whole. In this section, we analyze the
welfare e⁄ects of policy coordination with respect to tax and expenditure policies.
Note, however, that we are not discussing how such agreements are formed; only
their welfare e⁄ects if they are agreed upon and carried out. To simplify the analysis,
we assume that the initial equilibrium is symmetric.
4.1 Tax coordination
We analyze tax coordination in the sense that the capital tax rate (labor tax rate)
is marginally increased by all countries, while the labor tax rate (capital tax rate)
is held constant, i.e. dti > 0 and dtj = 0; i;j = c;w and i 6= j. To begin with,
let us consider the factor price changes in response to such a joint increase in ti
without taking into account how the resulting increase in expenditures a⁄ect the
factor prices. This enables us to better distinguish the di⁄erential welfare e⁄ects of
public expenditures to be discussed later. If all countries jointly increase their tax on
factor i, ti, worldwide capital allocation is not a⁄ected. In a symmetric equilibrium,
each country must still employ its capital endowment
K = K(w;r;P): (14)
Di⁄erentiating equations (8) and (14) with respect to the factor prices and the tax
rate ti, while holding G and P (as well as the other tax instruments) constant, we







rtijcoord: = rti + (1 + tc) ￿ ￿ti
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coord: ; (16)












where dK=d￿ = Krr￿ + Kwdw=d￿ < 0. Consequently, and in contrast to the unco-
ordinated case, a joint increase in tax rate ti alters the net interest rate according
10to equation (15). Equations (16)-(18) show that the impact on each of the other
factor prices can be decomposed into two e⁄ects. The ￿rst term on the right hand
side represents the factor price change that is also present in case of a unilateral tax
increase, i.e. at a constant ￿, which will be referred to as the ￿ autarky e⁄ect￿ . The
second term is the additional e⁄ect due to the change in the net interest rate, i.e.
the ￿ coordination e⁄ect￿ .
A joint tax increase carried out by all countries generates additional tax revenues
for each government, which are to be spent on public goods. This causes, in turn, a






while the associated changes in the gross interest rate and the wage rate are derived
in the same way as equations (16)-(18). If, on the other hand, the additional tax





again a⁄ecting the remaining factor prices in the same principal way.
We are now in the position to analyze the welfare e⁄ects of a marginal tax coor-
dination. Let W be the national welfare function for any of the countries involved,
so W = U(C;G), where all entities are evaluated at the noncooperative Nash equi-
librium described in the previous section. In addition, note that the welfare function
equals the Lagrangean at the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, so W = L. We can
derive the following result;
Proposition 3 Starting in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium and holding tax rate
tj constant, the welfare e⁄ect of a joint increase in tax ti; i = c;w; i 6= j; is given by
dW
dti
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
dP=0
coord:
= (V￿ + ￿R￿) ￿ti
￿ ￿
coord: + (V￿ + ￿R￿) ￿Gjcoord: ￿ Rtijcoord: , (21)







= (V￿ + ￿R￿) ￿ti
￿ ￿
coord: + (V￿ + ￿R￿) ￿Pjcoord: ￿ Rtijcoord: , (22)
if the additional tax revenue is spent on the public input good.
According to Proposition 3, the welfare e⁄ect following tax coordination cru-
cially depends on how the net interest rate responds to the policy variables. Each
11formula in the proposition is a straightforward consequence of the Envelope theo-
rem: although a coordinated increase in one of the tax rates (with the other tax
instruments held constant) causes a change in the real allocation by altering the
gross factor prices, there are no welfare changes associated with the autarky e⁄ect
mentioned above. This is so because each national government has already made an
optimal policy choice conditional on the net interest rate. Therefore, as the change
in the net interest rate is the only additional e⁄ect in case of policy coordination, it
is the only source of welfare change in this framework.
We show in the appendix that the welfare e⁄ect of an increase in the net interest
rate can be written as




The right hand side of this expression is decomposable into two parts. First, since
^ ￿ > 1, we have ￿UC(^ ￿ ￿ 1)K < 0. The intuition is that, to the extent that policy
coordination reduces the net interest rate, this is associated with a lump-sum transfer
from the capital owners to the government, which unambiguously increases welfare.
Second, a change in the net interest rate a⁄ects the union￿ s rent from bargaining
which, in turn, in￿ uences the net wage rate. To provide some intuition behind the
latter e⁄ect, notice that wtw > 0, so ￿UC(^ ￿￿1)!L=wtw < 0. Therefore, the second
part of the expression for V￿ + ￿R￿ is negative (positive) if !￿ > 0 (< 0); we derive







determines how the net wage rate responds an increase in the net interest rate (with
the gross interest rate held constant). The second term in the above expression is
the change in the union￿ s rent from bargaining, whereas the ￿rst re￿ ects that the
value the union attaches to a higher net wage rate decreases with the level of private
consumption (conditional on the rent). If the second term dominates, then !￿ > 0.
The intuition is that a lower wage rate contributes to increased employment which,
in turn, increases welfare in an economy with involuntary unemployment. Therefore,
if !￿ > 0, we have V￿ +￿R￿ < 0, implying that a decrease in the net interest rate is
welfare improving. The same result will, of course, apply in the special case where
the utility is linear in private consumption9, as this case means that the net wage
9Note that the wage rate is also una⁄ected, if we (instead of dividing the pro￿ts equally among
the households) de￿ne a separate group of households, called capital owners, the members of which
receive all pro￿t income. In this case, ￿ will have no direct e⁄ect on the wage rate.
12rate does not depend directly on ￿.
Note once again that the ￿rst term on the right hand side of equations (21)
and (22), respectively, denotes the welfare e⁄ect of a joint increase in ti (i = w;c),
with the other tax instruments held constant, irrespective of whether the additional
tax revenue is spent on G or P. The second term, on the other hand, shows the
additional welfare e⁄ect caused by increased provision of public goods. As such, the
latter e⁄ect must be weighted by the additional tax revenues, which determines the
extent to which the public provision can be increased (provided, of course, that the
tax revenues increase).
Let us start with the case where the additional tax revenues are spent on the
public consumption good. According to equations (21) and (19), two mechanisms
determine how increased provision of the public consumption good in￿ uences wel-
fare; (i) the relationship between welfare and the net interest rate, i.e. V￿ + ￿R￿
(which we discussed at some length above), and (ii) the impact of the public con-
sumption good on the wage rate, wG = !G(1 + tw). The sign of wG is ambiguous
in general. On the one hand, increased provision of the public consumption good
will change the union￿ s rent from bargaining, as it a⁄ects both the utility of the
bargaining outcome and the fall-back utility. On the other hand, it also a⁄ects the
marginal valuation of wage increases, as the public consumption good may be either
complementary with, or substitutable for, private consumption10. In a similar way,
the sign of the second term on the right hand side of equation (22) is also ambiguous.
Although it is common to have KP > 0,11 increasing the public input good has an
ambiguous e⁄ect on the net wage rate. From the perspective of society, therefore,
which public good that should be increased is determined by comparing (19) and
(20). The incentives underlying public provision are further discussed in Subsection
4.1.2.
The result presented in Proposition 3 appears to stand in contrast to Fuest
and Huber (1999), who consider labor and capital tax coordination in case the
additional tax revenues are spent on a public consumption good. They argue that,
in the presence of unemployment, a coordinated increase the labor or capital tax
reduces welfare, if the labor demand is inelastic with respect to the gross wage rate.
Although the wage rate will change as a consequence of policy coordination also in
our framework, we do not ￿nd such a crucial in￿ uence of the labor demand elasticity.
Our results show that the welfare e⁄ect is driven solely by the ability to reduce the
10See the appendix for a derivation.
11This is ensured by assuming that the public input good is a complement to private factors
(FLP > 0; FKP > 0) and both private factors are complements as well (FKL > 0):
13net interest rate, which captures rents from (i) the capital owners and (ii) the union
members (if !￿ > 0).
4.1.1 Coordination of the capital tax rate
So far, we have discussed the general cost bene￿t rule for coordination with respect
to any of the two distortionary tax instruments. The coordination agreement most
frequently analyzed in earlier literature is a marginal increase in the capital tax rate,
which is carried out by all countries simultaneously. A coordinated increase in the







while the associated changes the gross interest rate and wage rate are given by
equations (16)-(18). Therefore, the sign of ￿tc is ambiguous in general.
In the special case where the utility function quasi-linear in private consump-







wtcjcoord: = rtcjcoord: = !tcjcoord: = 0: (25)
Consequently, as all countries increase their capital tax rate, the entire tax burden
falls on the capital owners, since the capital endowment cannot evade worldwide
taxation, whereas dw=d￿ = wrr￿ and wtc are proportional, since this special case
implies that !￿ = 0. As the tax wedge on the labor market is not a⁄ected, the
real allocation is not altered. Therefore, a joint increase in the capital tax rate
unambiguously contributes to higher welfare; the total welfare change is positive in
case the additional tax revenues are spent on the public consumption good (since
!G = 0), and ambiguous if the additional tax revenues are spent on the public input
good (since !P is ambiguous).
4.1.2 Example: public expenditures and quasi-linear utility
Let us brie￿ y discuss each country￿ s spending decision following a joint increase in
the capital tax. To simplify, we consider the special case where the utility function is
linear in private consumption. The corresponding factor price reactions are given by
12It has been common in earlier literature on optimal linear taxation under wage bargaining to
assume a constant marginal utility of private consumption; see e.g. Boeters and Schneider (1999),
Koskela and Sch￿b (2002) and Richter and Schneider (2001).
14equations (24)-(25). Following Sch￿b (1994), we denote by MBF(G) and MBF(P)
the marginal bene￿t of public funds associated with the public consumption good
and the public input good, respectively. These expressions can be derived by using













1 ￿ RP ￿ R!!P
:
Note that the special with a quasi-linear utility function implies !G = 0, so MBF(G) =
VG. Since the policy choices already made at the national level mean MBF(G) =
MBF(P) = ￿, the government will be indi⁄erent between G and P in the uncoor-
dinated equilibrium.
However, when all countries have agreed to marginally increase their capital tax
and face the abovementioned reduction in the net interest rate, they may, neverthe-
less, strictly prefer to spend the additional tax revenue either on G or P, depending
on how the MBF measures change due to capital tax coordination. The additional
tax revenue is used to increase the provision of the public input good instead of the













which can be rewritten as13
(KP + KwwP)(1 ￿ dR=dP) > 0: (26)
Inequality (26) suggests that the individual spending decision of each country fol-
lowing a capital tax coordination deviates from the spending decision that is rational
for all countries, collectively. Since V￿ + ￿R￿ < 0, combining equations (19) to (22)
shows that it is welfare superior for all countries to increase the public input good
instead of public consumption good provision if
KP + KwwP < 0: (27)
Consequently, for the special case where the public input good has no impact on the
tax revenues, i.e. dR=dP = 0, each country￿ s incentive regarding the composition of
additional public expenditures is exactly the opposite to the spending decision that
gives the largest welfare gain for all countries.
13See the appendix for a derivation.
15Intuitively, it is not surprising that the individual countries may face incorrect
incentives (from the perspective of society as a whole) with respect to additional
public good provision. Since the tax coordination forces each government to deviate
from its individually most preferred allocation, there is an incentive for the national
government to use the pattern of public spending in order to again engage in ￿scal
competition by attracting mobile capital.14 By inspecting equation (27) and the
counterpart to equation (26), i.e. the national decision rule to spend revenues on G,
we can conclude the following as a more general result. If it is socially optimal to
spend the additional tax revenues on the public input good, then each country will
inevitably face the wrong incentive and spend it on the public consumption good,
if the in￿ uence of the public input good on the tax revenue is non-negative. An
analogous conclusion holds if the socially optimal decision is to spend the revenue
on G.
4.1.3 Coordination of the wage tax rate
Instead of jointly increasing the capital tax rate, let us consider a coordinated change
in the labor tax with the capital tax held constant. As has been pointed out by
Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), a joint increase in the labor tax will also a⁄ect the
capital demand, which calls for an adjustment in the net interest rate. In contrast
to the coordinated change in the capital tax, however, a joint increase in the labor
tax adds to the tax wedge in the labor market. This, in turn, raises the gross wage
and reduces employment. Therefore, the worldwide allocation is altered (even if we
were to assume that the utility function is linear in private consumption).
Formally, from equations (8) and (14), we obtain the corresponding factor price







If capital and labor are price complements, a coordinated increase in the labor tax
reduces the worldwide capital demand, which calls for a reduction in the net interest
rate to fully employ capital again. Therefore, given that V￿ + ￿R￿ < 0, this e⁄ect
contributes to higher welfare.
14Theoretically, countries may also react by adjusting the wage tax in order to attract capital
again. However, we exclude this possibility in this paper. For a model of partial tax coordination,
see Wehke (2006).
164.2 A coordinated reform of government spending
Following Keen and Marchand (1997), let us consider a revenue-neutral change in the
composition of government spending by all countries. Keen and Marchand assume
a competitive labor market, and a utility function in which the disutility of labor
enters the private consumption term additively. Given these assumptions, the public
consumption good does not a⁄ect the labor market equilibrium, and the result is
clear-cut: the Nash equilibrium is characterized by a relative overprovision of the
public input good. The intuition is that each country has an incentive to increase
the domestic capital stock by increasing the provision of the public input good. The
mechanisms emphasized are (i) a direct positive e⁄ect on the marginal product of
capital and (ii) complementarity between labor and capital. Therefore, since there
is no such link between the public consumption good and the marginal product of
capital, each country will excessively use the public input good to attract capital at
the expense of other countries.





















= WGjcoord: ￿ WPjcoord: :
By analogy to the analysis carried out above, we can use the envelope theorem to
determine
WPjcoord: = (V￿ + ￿R￿) ￿Pjcoord: ;
WGjcoord: = (V￿ + ￿R￿) ￿Gjcoord: :
Therefore, by using V￿ + ￿R￿ = ￿UC(^ ￿ ￿ 1)(K + !￿!L=wtw), we can derive the
following result;
Proposition 4 In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the welfare e⁄ect of a joint
revenue-neutral increase in the public consumption good and corresponding reduction







= UC(^ ￿ ￿ 1)(K + !￿!L=wtw)(￿Pjcoord: ￿ ￿Gjcoord:):
To interpret Proposition 4, let us assume that V￿ + ￿R￿ < 0. Then, by using









= signfKP + Kw (wP ￿ wG)g:
Therefore, the sign of the welfare e⁄ect depends on whether the public consumption
good is complementary with, or substitutable for, private consumption as well as on
the properties of the production function. The properties of the production function
determine to what extent the wage rate responds to increased provision of the public
input good as well as the magnitudes of the terms KP and Kw. An increase in the
public consumption good may give rise to a positive, negative or no external e⁄ect
























The possibility that wG 6= 0 was assumed away by Keen and Marchand due to their
choice of functional form of the utility function. For the public input good, on the
other hand, there are two channels of in￿ uence on the capital stock
dK
dP
= KP + KwwP:
The direct e⁄ect, KP, is positive due to the complementarity between the public
input good and the private production factors, whereas the indirect e⁄ect via the
wage rate can go in either direction. Therefore, in contrast to a competitive labor
market, this may o⁄set the direct e⁄ect of higher public input provision.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we consider factor income taxation and public good provision in
small open economies, which compete for mobile capital and are characterized by
involuntary unemployment due to wage bargaining between unions and ￿rms. Each
national government can spend its tax revenues on a public consumption good and
a public input good. The paper contributes to the literature in two ways; (i) by
characterizing the Nash equilibrium, which is based on the assumption that each
country treats the world interest rate as well as the policies chosen by other countries
as exogenous, and (ii) by considering policy coordination. We examine the welfare
e⁄ects of a coordinated increase in each distortionary tax, where the additional tax
revenues are spent either on the public consumption good or the public input good,
and a revenue neutral reallocation of the public expenditures.
18We would like to emphasize two distinct results. First, tax coordination con-
tributes to higher welfare, if it reduces the net interest rate (which counteracts the
incentives associated with tax competition for mobile capital) and the net wage rate.
Therefore, the welfare e⁄ects of coordination is interpretable in terms of the pos-
sibility to capture rents from the private sector. Second, the relative overprovision
of the public input good derived by Keen and Marchand (1997) in the context of
a competitive economy needs not necessarily carry over to an economy with wage
bargaining. The reason is that increased provision of the public consumption good
and the public input good may change the wage rate in either direction.
To further address the consequences of tax and expenditure policies in small open
economies, as well as analyze the e⁄ects of policy coordination, there are several
possible ways to extend the analysis carried out in the paper. One is to allow for
a choice of work hours among the employed, which means an additional margin
relevant for public policy. This is particularly interesting from the perspective of
the labor income tax, as the employed individuals may not (themselves) choose
the hours of work in an optimal way from society￿ s point if view in an economy
with involuntary unemployment (see Aronsson and Sj￿gren (2004a)). Another is
to incorporate heterogeneity and redistribution into the analysis. This would also
provide a natural framework for analyzing nonlinear tax instruments (instead of
the linear instruments used in our paper). We hope to address these, and other,
extensions in the future.
19Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Noting that wtw = ! + (1 + tw)!tw, the ￿rst order condition with respect to the
labor tax, i.e. Ltw = 0, can be written as
(^ ￿￿1)[￿L!tw + (1 ￿ ts)Lwtw]+(!￿b)Lwwtw+^ ￿[tw!Lwwtw + tc￿Kwwt!] = 0: (29)
The corresponding condition for the capital tax is Ltc = 0 and yields the following:
(^ ￿ ￿ 1)[￿L!tc + (1 ￿ ts)(Lwtc + ￿K)] + (! ￿ b)(Lwwtc + Lr￿)
+^ ￿[tw!(Lwwtc + Lr￿) + tc￿(Kwwtc + Kr￿)] = 0: (30)
Multiplying equation (29) by !tc and equation (30) by !tw enables us to combine
both expressions to get
(^ ￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ts)(!L!tc ￿ ￿K!tw) + (! ￿ b)(Lw!!tc ￿ Lr￿!tw)
+^ ￿[tw!(Lw!!tc ￿ Lr￿!tw) + tc￿(Kw!!tc ￿ Kr￿!tw)] = 0: (31)
After plugging in Lw = FKK=￿; Kr = FLL=￿ and Lr = Kw = ￿FLK=￿; where ￿ =
FLLFKK ￿ (FLK)
2 ; and substituting equation (31) into (29) and (30), respectively,
we arrive at the optimal tax formulas as given in the Proposition.
Wage bargaining
The ￿rst order condition for the net wage rate can be written as
￿! = 0 ) e ￿! = a
￿!
￿





￿! = ￿L(1 + tw) < 0 (33)
￿! = UC ￿ [L + (! ￿ b)Lw(1 + tw)] > 0; (34)
The sign restriction on expression (34) follows from expressions (32) and (33). In
deriving (34), we think of the net pro￿t accruing to the union members as the
average pro￿t in the economy as a whole, which cannot be in￿ uenced by a small
union￿ s wage setting.





where e ￿!! < 0 according to the second order condition. Furthermore,














The in￿ uence of the public consumption good on the wage rate
Since sign(!i) = sign(e ￿!i), and ￿!=￿ is una⁄ected by a change in the public
consumption, we are left with






















where U0 and U0
G are evaluated at C0. The ￿rst term in brackets is positive (neg-
ative) if the public consumption good is complementary with (substitutable for)
private consumption, i.e. UCG > (<) 0, implying that an increase in G increases
(decreases) the marginal bene￿t of a wage increase. The second term is the increased
(decreased) rent from bargaining facing the union if UG￿UG
0 > (<) 0, which works
to reduce (increase) the wage claims.
The in￿ uence of the public input good on the wage rate
Following the above procedure, we have























￿2 [￿!P￿ ￿ ￿!￿P];
where ￿! is given by equation (34) and







￿!P = UC [LP + (! ￿ b)LwP(1 + tw)]
+ UCC[L + (! ￿ b)Lw(1 + tw)]
| {z }
=￿!=UC
[(! ￿ b)LP + (1 ￿ ts)￿P]
= UC [LP + (! ￿ b)LwP(1 + tw)] +
UCC
UC































The ￿rst term in the upper line of equation (36) re￿ ects the union￿ s incentives to
alter its wage claim, as an increase in the public input good changes the marginal
bene￿t of a higher wage rate. On the one hand, the union will ceteris paribus demand
higher wages as the public input good increases labor demand. On the other hand,
the union wants the reduce (increase) the wage rate, if the additional public good
provision increases (decreases) the wage responsiveness of labor demand. The second
term in the upper line shows that the union has an incentive to ceteris paribus call
for lower wages as the marginal utility of private consumption is decreasing, and the
total rent from bargaining is increasing in the public input good. The term in the
lower line of (36) will vanish if the utility is linear in consumption, and is ambiguous
for UCC < 0 as this also implies UC ￿ U0
C < 0: Inspecting the second term on the
























Derivation of wtw > 0
From w = !(1 + tw), we have
wtw = (1 + tw)!tw + !
=
￿e ￿!tw(1 + tw) + e ￿!!!
e ￿!!
; (37)
















































+ w￿UCC [L + (! ￿ b)Lw(1 + tw)][(! ￿ b)Lw ￿ (1 ￿ ts)L]










￿2 fw￿UC [Lw + (! ￿ b)(1 + tw)Lww + Lw]
+ w￿UCC [L + (! ￿ b)Lw(1 + tw)]
￿




￿w￿!UC [(! ￿ b)Lw ￿ (1 ￿ ts)L]g:
Consequently, we can write the numerator of equation (37) as follows:
















+ (1 ￿ ts)
￿￿
:
Thus, as ￿;UC;￿!;[1 ￿ (! ￿ b)=!];(1 + tw);(1 ￿ ts) > 0 and UCC;Lw < 0 we can
also conclude that wtw > 0:
Derivation of V￿ + ￿R￿ = ￿UC(^ ￿ ￿ 1)(K + !￿!L=wtw)
Note that
V￿ + ￿R￿
= UCK + ￿tcK
+ r￿ fUC ￿ [(! ￿ b)(Lr + Lwwr) + L!r + (1 ￿ ts)(￿K ￿ Lwr)]
+￿[ts(￿K ￿ Lwr) + twL!r + tw! (Lr + Lwwr) + tc￿(Kr + Kwwr)]g
+ !￿ fUC ￿ [(! ￿ b)Lw(1 + tw) + L ￿ (1 ￿ ts)L(1 + tw)]
+￿[￿tsL(1 + tw) + twL + tw!Lw(1 + tw) + tc￿Kw(1 + tw)]g; (38)
where r￿ = (1+tc). By inserting the optimal tax rates the last term in curly brackets
can be rearranged to
￿
UC!L(^ ￿ ￿ 1)
wtw
:
Note that the ￿rst order condition for the capital tax, Vtc +￿Rtc = 0, can be written
0 = ￿￿K + rtc fUC ￿ [(! ￿ b)(Lr + Lwwr) + L!r + (1 ￿ ts)(￿K ￿ Lwr)]
+￿[ts(￿K ￿ Lwr) + twL!r + tw! (Lr + Lwwr) + tc￿(Kr + Kwwr)]g;
23where rtc = ￿, and the term in curly brackets exactly coincides with the ￿rst term
in curly bracket in equation (38). Thus, by inserting f￿g = ￿￿K into the (38), we
have
V￿ + ￿R￿ = UCK + ￿tcK ￿ ￿K(1 + tc)
+ !￿ fUC ￿ [(! ￿ b)Lw(1 + tw) + L ￿ (1 ￿ ts)L(1 + tw)]
+￿[￿tsL(1 + tw) + twL + tw!Lw(1 + tw) + tc￿Kw(1 + tw)]g: (39)
In order to simplify this expression, we make use of the ￿rst-order condition for the
labor tax, Vtw + ￿Rtw = 0, i.e.
0 = UC[!twL + (! ￿ b)Lwwtw ￿ (1 ￿ ts)Lwtw]
+ ￿[￿tsLwtw + !L + twL!tw + tw!Lwwtw + tc￿Kwwtw]
which can be rearranged to
!tw fUC [L + (! ￿ b)Lw(1 + tw) ￿ (1 ￿ ts)L(1 + tw)]
+￿[￿tsL(1 + tw) + twL + tw!Lw(1 + tw) + tc￿Kw(1 + tw)]g
= UC [￿(! ￿ b)Lw! + (1 ￿ ts)L!] + ￿[tsL! ￿ !L ￿ tw!Lw! ￿ tc￿Kw!];
Inserting this formula into equation (39), we have








Finally, using the optimal tax rates in the Nash equilibrium in equation (40), we
￿nd that
￿(! ￿ b)Lw ￿ (^ ￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ts)L ￿ ^ ￿(tw!Lw + tc￿Kw) = ￿(^ ￿ ￿ 1)L!tw=wtw
so
V￿ + ￿R￿ = ￿UCK(^ ￿ ￿ 1) ￿
!￿
wtw
!UC(^ ￿ ￿ 1)L








24as given in the text, where the only term whose sign is ambiguous is !￿ [see equation
(41) below].
Factor price changes in response to capital tax coordination
By totally di⁄erentiating K = K(w;r;P) and taking ! = !(tw;r;￿;P;G) from







Krrtc + Kw(1 + tw)!rrtc




Kr + Kw(1 + tw)!r






Kw(1 + tw)!￿=(1 + tc)
Kr + Kw(1 + tw)!r + Kw(1 + tw)!￿=(1 + tc)
￿
:
For the wage response to a change in the net interest rate (at a constant r), we need






















































[UCC=UC ￿ (UC ￿ U0
C)=￿]
Kr + Kw(1 + tw)!r + Kw(1 + tw)!￿=(1 + tc)
3
5
Derivation of equation (26)
The marginal tax revenues from higher public spending are given by
R!!G = 0; (42)
25since we restrict our example to a quasi-linear utility function, and
RP + R!!P = (1 ￿ ts)￿P + tc￿KP + tw!LP + (1 ￿ ts)￿w(1 + tw)!P
+ tc￿Kw(1 + tw)!P + twL!P + tw!Lw(1 + tw)!P; (43)
respectively. For the special case where the utility function is linear in private
consumption, a joint increase in the capital tax does not a⁄ect the real allocation.
Consequently, in equation (43) only the terms that contain tc￿ will change due to a
capital tax coordination. Since VG = UG and VP + V!!P = UC[L!P + (! ￿ b)LP +
(1￿ts)￿P]+UC[L+(! ￿b)Lw(1+tw)]!P are not altered by a joint increase in the




























(1 ￿ RP ￿ R!!P)
2
=
MBF(P) ￿ [KP + Kw(1 + tw)!P]
(1 ￿ RP ￿ R!!P)
@(tc￿)
@tc
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
coord:
:
Using MBF(P) > 0; the expression@(tc￿)=@tcjcoord: = ￿=(1 + tc) > 0 as well as the
assumption that the model is stable in the sense that 1 ￿ dR=dP > 0; yields the
inequality (26) as given in the text.
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